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EAST TIMOR AND INDONESIA: WAYS TO FREEDOM, SELFDETERMINATION AND DEMOCRACY, JULY 1993

Indonesia's ORDE BARU

The **ORDE BARU** (New Order) came into being in 1965, in the aftermath of the events of 1 October 1965. The same General Suharto who took power in that period is still in power. But the aging process is taking its natural course and by 1998, the end of Suharto's sixth presidential term, it is expected that he will step down. For many, Suharto and the **ORDE BARU** are synonymous: Suharto's demise will also mean the demise of the **ORDE BARU**. It has become the utmost urgency to deal with this matter: the post–Suharto period.

To be able to make an assessment of present day Indonesian politics and to be able to forecast future scenario(s), it is imperative to look back in history and try to formulate the major trends and developments of the **ORDE BARU**, in particular the political and economic dimensions of the last three decades.

The first crucial assessment is to define the nature of the Indonesian regime. While after 1965 the **ORDE BARU** was often described as a military regime, most Indonesianists nowadays reject or avoid labelling the Indonesian regime as a military regime. Using conventional definitions about a military regime, the Indonesian regime indeed does not fall under the category of military juntas. On the other hand there is no dispute that ABRI (the Indonesian armed forces) still plays a paramount role in the Indonesian society. We have to explore this further.

It is further argued that ABRI's role in society in general is in a continuing process of decline. It is argued that, one: the presence of ABRI personnel in Suharto's latest cabinet is regressive, two: ABRI's role in the economy has become marginal, three: ABRI does not seems to have an adequate political concept and four: ABRI doesn't seem to have a suitable candidate in the battle of succession of the near future.

ABRI's presence in the cabinet has indeed declined. Both in quantity and in quality. Some key positions regarding security and order are obviously still in the hands of the military like the coordinating minister for Politics and Security, the Home Ministry and the Defence Ministry. Nowadays Suharto is much more relying on ministers with specialised skilled both technocrats and technologists. Technocrats are those who designed the broad outlines of the Indonesian economy in accordance with World Bank/IMF plans while technologists are those who possess specialist skills in a certain area. In general technocrats pursue an economic development through an export–oriented strategy while the technologists want to develop a long term high–tech industry.

On the other hand ABRI's position in all the other echelons of the administration is steadily growing again. The 'civic mission' of ABRI, in the seventies known as *kekaryaan* or now more known as *sospol* (from sosial politik) enables numerous officers to fill positions in society. Although fewer than in the seventies, the number of ABRI posted in *sospol* posts is high: 12 of the 27 governors are ABRI men (the number is still growing), as are 134 of the 299 district heads and hundreds of village-heads. In addition, many thousands of ABRI personnel function as top civil servants, managers and directors of state and private companies. There are 100 (20%) appointed ABRI members in Parliament along with another 114 members in the *MPR* (Peoples Congress).

The army's *sospol* function dates back to the fifties when officers were frustrated because social and political affairs were decided solely by politicians. In the late fifties, army officers started emerging as cabinet ministers and the military became a political and economic force.

ABRI's role in the economy has also declined. While in the fifties till the late seventies practically all economic activities were tied to military groups; the economic boom of the eighties left the military virtually empty handed.

In the fifties it became a custom for army territorial commands to have their own economic activities. Private companies run jointly by businessmen and army commanders became rampant. Suharto himself, army commander of the Diponegoro Central Java military command in the mid fifties, was fully entrenched in all kinds of economic escapades. In the early eighties Suharto centralised all the army companies under the supervision of the army chief of staff. Although extra hand-outs, next to normal salaries, remain customary, it is now centralised and falls directly the army headquarters in *Cilangkap* who makes the decisions.

While the military economic activities have been limited to one cartel called PT TRUBA, the president's office is controlling five *yayasan* (foundations) which harbour almost unlimited sums. The money is extracted monthly from the wages of the civil servants. The enormous growth of business interests of the extended Suharto family has also left the military with a smaller portion of the national cake.

While the military have been given forest concessions, shares in the domestic airline and involvement in real estate business, the economic boom of the eighties went largely to private companies, usually called conglomerates, with little or no military participation.

The relationship between the booming manufacturing industry and the local military is at the very least troublesome. The export-oriented industry uses the comparative advantage, or in other words pays starvation wages. The result is obvious: an unprecedented wave of workers strikes. The local military are using this relatively new

phenomena to develop elaborate mafia practices: extort large sums from the company bosses to "safeguard" companies from strikes or use military force against peaceful workers protests.

The upsurge in arms purchases by Indonesia is also a convenient way of 'earning' extra money. The recent purchase of a squadron (24) UK Hawks fighter-planes means easy money for the armed forces. The usual smear money involved is around $1 million to $1.5 million per airplane. Half of he East German fleet will also go to the Indonesian Navy. While the ships are sold at rock bottom prices, the refurbishment involved will cost around $1 billion, another opportunity to fill the secret Swiss bank accounts of the ABRI top.

Some analysts noticed that the *Cilangkap* top brass lack any political concept. This is true in the sense that *Cilangkap* doesn't have a political program. Moreover the three leading officers: Minister of Defence General Edi Sudradjat, ABRI Commander-in-Chief General Feisal Tandjung and Army Chief-of-Staff Lt. General Wismoyo Arismunandar haven't shown any signs political astuteness nor sophistication. They are typical products of the *generasi akademi*, people who graduated from the AMN military academy, a professional training as military but greenhorns in the game of politics.

The lack of political thinking among the ABRI top brass is in fact nothing specific. The overall majority of the previous generation of officers, with a very few exceptions, also lacked sophistication. Probably the most significant characteristics of the **ORDE BARU** is depoliticisation. The whole Indonesian society is depoliticised, all the formal political institutions are a sham. It is not only ABRI who doesn't possess any political concept, it is the entire Indonesian society who has been banned from politics.

The Indonesian army has always had a high profile in political affairs. During the independence struggle of 1945-1950, the army consisted predominantly of ill-trained youngsters, a far cry from a professional army. The recruits came from many social backgrounds, whilst the officers originated from the *priyayi*, the aristocracy of Javanese society as did political leaders. It was therefore no accident that in the fifties military officers continued to be active in politics, together with politicians from the same background. In fact, the political outlook of the average military man reflected the political contours; nationalist, Muslim, socialist, communist etc. In those liberal days, sections of the army were involved in many national events such as coup d'etat attempts and rebellions against the central government.

This all changed in 1965. When Suharto took over, a thorough purge of ABRI was implemented. Many thousands of officers and soldiers were sacked, imprisoned, convicted or murdered: Suharto knew well the dangers of a politically active armed forces.

In 1969, Suharto secured an agreement with civilians and military called the *Konsensus*

Nasional, which was an agreement to keep the military out of electoral politics while allocating ABRI 10 per cent of the seats in parliament. It was argued that if the military were allowed to vote, a situation like the fifties would emerge, with the military backing this or that grouping. The *Konsensus Nasional* has worked in Suharto's favour. The fifties situation is seen as a nightmare by the average ABRI officer: an ABRI split into many factions and involved in rebellions has no place in the days of the professional soldier.

It is also argued that among the present ABRI batch there is nobody with the posture of a future president. Suharto himself has never given any hint about succession candidates. In the mid seventies there were some attempts to create a military junta by rotating the presidency. Some of the potential candidates for the presidency, notably General Surono and General Widodo, briefly appeared in the limelight, but disappeared in oblivion. Both had the same background as Suharto: ethnic Javanese and ex commander of the Central Java Diponegoro division. Since 1980 Suharto has increasingly moulded the **ORDE BARU** regime into a Suharto regime. In this construction, one asset has become increasingly important: unreserved loyalty towards Suharto.

As president, Suharto is *Panglima Tertinggi*, Supreme Commander, which gives him the authority to appoint the ABRI top brass. Presidential appointees have increasingly been based on loyalty rather than professional merit. This includes the cabinet ministers with a technocratic or technology background who will be loyal to whoever is president.

Despite the apparent weaknesses that ABRI shows, Indonesia remains the most militarised (and militaristic) country in the region, probably only Myanmar shows similar militaristic features. Military leaders in Myanmar recently expressed their admiration towards the Indonesian model: military representation in all echelons of the society.

Even military in countries like Thailand, notorious for its military coups in the past, the military still have to justify their rule to the general public. The same in South Korea that has been ruled by military dictators since the fifties. In Indonesia, military don't have to justify their leading positions in society to the general public.

The foundation of Indonesian militarism lies in the fact that the military do not see themselves as an instrument of the state. The military claim that they were the major and decisive factor in the creation of the Indonesian state and therefore see themselves as the embodiment of Indonesian nationalism. This view justifies military interference in the very fabric of the Indonesian society.

The present ABRI top cannot claim to have taken part in the struggle for independence. They still justify their role in society because they continue the banner of the *Angkatan 45* , the generation of 1945. Furthermore explains Commander in Chief

General Feisal Tandjung, it is only the military who is prepared to sacrifice their lives for the love of their country.

Two important military doctrines form the base of deep rooted militarism in the Indonesian society. Both doctrines are enshrined in the existing laws and constitution. The first doctrine is called *Dwifungsi* or Dual Function and the other is the territorial concept called *Hankamrata* , the Overall People's Defence and Security System. The two doctrines serve a solid ideological basis for the military role in the society.

Dwifungsi (Dual Function) is the ABRI doctrine legitimising the military role in every sector of society, enabling the army to perform a military and a non-military role. In the first two decades of the New Order, Dual Function was applied everywhere. The 'civic mission' of ABRI, known as *kekaryaan* or *sospol* (from sosial politik), enabled numerous officers to become cabinet ministers, directors of state and private firms, governors, district, subdistrict and village heads, MPs and so on.

The *Dwifungsi* doctrine emerged in the late fifties, an invention of General A.H. Nasution, and became the driving force for the military to achieve their ultimate aim: rule over the Indonesian society. The three top people in the administration are retired military: President Suharto, Vice-President Try Sutrisno and Secretary of State (similar to the White House Chief of Staff) Moerdiono.

The other doctrine: *Hankamrata* is arguably the best way to explain the effectiveness of military control over society. This territorial doctrine argues that the entire population is co-responsible for the defence of the nation. In a practical sense it means the population down to the most remote villages are part of an elaborate territorial system. The *babinsa*, the territorial officer in the village is supported by a kind of neighbourhood watch called *RT/RW*, who monitor the movement of the people and any stranger entering the neighbourhood has to report to the *RT/RW*. In periods of tension, like in Aceh or East Timor, the *hankamrata* territorial strategy is applied in the most vicious way to the extent that everybody is obliged to spy on everybody, creating widespread distrust.

The *hankamrata* strategy explains why ABRI with a relative small number of troops is able to control the 190 million population. In the neighbourhoods the implementation of the *hankamrata* strategy is called *siskamling (sistim keamanan lingkungan)* literally neighbourhood security system. Everybody who lives or has lived in Indonesia know the suffocating effects of *siskamling* on the population. *Siskamling* takes different shapes depending on the local political conditions: in its mildest form it has a watchdog function, to prevent people from taking any initiative and in its most extreme form it takes the shape of the low intensity conflict strategy: hitting hard at the defenceless population if insurgency emerges in the region. *Hankamrata* is full fledged militarism and is the prime argument why Indonesia **should still be called a military regime.**

The way *siskamling* or *hankamrata* functions in many parts of Indonesia is amazing indeed. Tanks or armoured cars are absent from the street corners. Armed soldiers on the streets are also relatively scarce. But the Indonesian society in the **ORDE BARU** live under fear and oppression. It is the Indonesian style of militarism, already proven to be more effective than the excessive presence of the soldiers in many military dictatorships of Latin America in the seventies and early eighties.

While the Indonesian society is still under the control of an effective well-oiled military territorial machine, the situation in high circles in Jakarta looks quite different. Since 1980 Suharto, somebody with a military background himself, has made serious efforts to curb military influence in the decision making process.

It is a public secret that Suharto's relationship with *Cilangkap* (ABRI headquarters) has deteriorated. Suharto's inner core of confidants in the sixties and seventies consisted mainly of military while today Suharto relies almost solely on technocrats/technologists and business cronies. Some analysts say Suharto's power is now much more based on the purse than on the gun.

One important feature of **ORDE BARU** management is financial clientelism. Suharto's office, *Bina Graha*, next to handling state affairs, is also in charge of the *yayasans* or foundations. The Suharto *yayasans* are of a special sort. He is chairman of 5 *yayasans* and is also responsible for another 11 state-run *yayasans*. Officially they carry a charitable status, meaning their finances go unaudited and are exempted from paying taxes. A rough estimate say the Suharto controlled *yayasans* carry at least $5 billion in assets and has become an important chunk of the Indonesian economy. Suharto uses the money as a slush fund: channel money to buy or bribe loyalties, boost patron-client relations and last but not least cornering lucrative contracts.

As said earlier, Suharto's position depends largely on his placing the most vital army jobs in the hands of men he can trust, an increasingly difficult task for the aging dictator. Many warriors of his generation have died; others have been alienated or have become adversaries. Despite their paramount position in society, Indonesian generals have not become a military caste. Most of their offspring have joined the ranks of the aspiring entrepreneurial class. The younger generation of *AMN* graduates come from a wide social background and the present top echelon of *Cilangkap* consists predominantly of officers whose loyalty to the president is at the very least questionable. It is therefore no accident that in the past two years, the conflict between Suharto and *Cilangkap* has been dominated by the delicate issue of promotions and transfers.

While Suharto has developed an elaborate system of patronage with the obvious criterion of unabated loyalty to the president, the *Cilangkap* top rely on other criteria. Military who managed to emerge at the top, according to *Cilangkap* criteria, are East Timor veterans, member of the notorious *Kopassus* (red beret) commandos or from *BAIS*, the army intelligence. General Benny Murdani, architect of the East Timor

invasion, embodies all three qualifications. Until very recent General Benny Murdani was the most influential officer but was ditched from the 1993 cabinet because of mounting conflicts with President Suharto.

Another battleground is the control over GOLKAR, the ruling party of Indonesia. Although the **ORDE BARU** recognises three political groupings it is only GOLKAR that can be seen as the sole political asset. The other two: PDI and PPP function mainly as mere decoration for the sake of a 'multi' party system. It could be conveniently be argued that the **ORDE BARU** system is basically a one-party system.

GOLKAR was initiated in the early sixties by the wings in the military to counter the growing threat of communism. It was a kind of loose federation run by middle ranking officers who were assigned to run state companies. The dominant ideological views were corporatist i.e. a so called harmonious model between the state, corporations and workers.

GOLKAR became the political vehicle of the **ORDE BARU.** Both Suharto and ABRI worked mutually to mould GOLKAR into a dinosaur. In numbers GOLKAR can compete with the Chinese Communist Party. All cabinet ministers are members of GOLKAR, all the provincial governors down to the village heads had to adhere to GOLKAR. The four million civil servants (plus family) organised in KORPRI became an essential part of GOLKAR and had to vote for GOLKAR. Also the *KBA (Keluarga Besar ABRI*, the Great ABRI Family) consisting of the sons and daughters of the military, the wives, the veterans is an integral part of GOLKAR.

GOLKAR became the example par excellence how political clientelism was engineered in the **ORDE BARU.** GOLKAR always achieved a convenient absolute majority in national or regional elections. GOLKAR members also took the largest share of positions in ministries, government or semi-government institutions, state companies, state banks etc. President Suharto secured a *dana abadi* (unlimited funding) for the GOLKAR head office and its provincial branches. For many Indonesians GOLKAR became directly or indirectly the source of income and the place to achieve a career.

GOLKAR chairmen were obviously chosen from ABRI ranks but the new chairman to be elected in September 1993 has become a heated issue. The battle over the GOLKAR leadership is a proper reflection of present day Indonesian politics. While *Cilangkap* is openly backing the candidacy of (a) military, Suharto has given signals that he favours a civilian.

The future of GOLKAR has become somewhat uncertain. Recent experiences like in Japan (LDP) and Italy (DC) can become a lesson for GOLKAR. Different fractions have emerged within GOLKAR and the Suharto-ABRI conflict will also be fought within GOLKAR.

Another earlier clash, the appointment of the vice-president, was also an open clash between the president and *Cilangkap*. The military top promoted General Try Sutrisno in such an aggressive way that Suharto decided wisely to accept the candidacy. It is clear now that General Try Sutrisno will be left almost unemployed in his new position while all the important decisions are taken elsewhere.

Rudy Habibie, Suharto's favourite minister for Technology, has become one of the most powerful men in the country. Although he runs all the companies of the military industrial complex (airplanes, ships and weapons) his relationship with *Cilangkap* is also troublesome. He is seen as the chief of the technologists wing in the cabinet and is chairman of *ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslimin Indonesia* , Organisation of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals). *ICMI* has become a powerhouse which links politicians, civil servants, students and social activists together. The growing Suharto/Habibie alliance is a source of increased irritation by many, not in the least by the military.

While genuine political life in the **ORDE BARU** is almost non-existent, economical life of the **ORDE BARU** is a different story. Suharto has been declared *Bapak Pembangunan*, Father of Development because of his economic achievements. This generous title could be argued seriously. Any other more democratic president could have arguably achieved much more than Suharto, considering the favourable conditions of Indonesia. In many ways Suharto has been quite fortunate. Indonesia possesses large natural wealth: To name some energy sources: Indonesia is still Asia's largest oil exporter, it is the largest lng exporter in the world and it has become the fourth largest coal exporter after Australia, South Africa and the US.

With the large amounts of revenues Indonesia was able to pour masses of money in a wide variety of projects: giant steel mills, satellite networks, airplane industry, infra structural works, schools etc. The whole Asia Pacific region enjoyed a boom period and Indonesia received its share of investments in the manufacturing industry. Indonesia became one of Asia's cubs, following the tigers like Hongkong, Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea. The manufacturing output will soon surpass the income from oil or agricultural output. In the last five years a huge amount of $34 billion of direct foreign investment entered Indonesia. The economic growth has remained steady, an average of almost 7% in the last few years.

This apparent success story has also its darker side. Indonesia is Asia's largest debtor. The external public and private debt is estimated as $85 billion. The public debt is around $50 billion and the debt servicing alone this year will absorb $7.2 billion, much higher than the expected $5 billion aid from the CGI consortium.

Non-oil exports have grown to $23 billion but non-oil imports have also grown to $27 billion, a growing deficit. The huge amount of foreign investment is facing a slow down and foreign capital seems to be rushing to other bonanza countries like China,

Vietnam and India who entice foreign capital with even more attractive conditions like tax holidays, high productivity and good infrastructure.

The Indonesian banking system is in a mess and the casino boom years of the late eighties have created many difficulties for cash flow of the banking sector. The collapse of Bank Summa one of the largest private banks is an indication of the serious situation. Most of the banks are ridden by bad debts, a result of the unbridled growth of the eighties. Economic analysts estimate that the non-performing loans (no interests paid for more than three months) of the state banks are 15 to 30% of their portfolios. According to recent leaked out list at the end of last year 21,500 billion rupiah (US$ 10.6 billion) nearly a third of the state banks' total credit, had been lent to just 35 companies, of which 26 were in default on loans. Those in default include conglomerates run by the Suharto families and cronies. It is expected that a major overhaul of the entire banking system (including the merger of many banks) will be needed to put it on its feet again.

Unlike other Asia Pacific countries with relatively small populations, Indonesia has to deal with 2.3 million entrants to the labour market every year. Indonesian workers are the lowest paid in the region, average wage costs are 30 dollar cents (about one third of neighbouring Thailand and Malaysia) and even lower than the meagre wages on offer in China.

The World Bank has also voiced worries and in the 1993 World Bank report on Indonesia (called Sustaining Development) it criticises the Indonesian government by saying that the results of the latest measures of deregulation aren't impressive. The World Bank has been pressing for several years running to liberalise (or deregulate) the economy. Unless this happens, it is argued, Indonesia risks of falling behind its fast growing neighbours. Although the CGI, the donor consortium on Indonesia, continued to aid Indonesia (this year US$ 5.1 billion) worries about the Indonesian economy are growing.

The Indonesian economy has gone in two different directions. While in one hand a section of the manufacturing industry has entered the competitive global market, other sectors have remained heavily protected. The series of economic reforms in the mid eighties, in theory to develop a laissez faire economy, turned out to be very lucrative for the well-connected conglomerates. In the meantime new monopolies emerged, primarily run by the six Suharto offspring. The business interests of the Suharto family has become one of the biggest issues in present Indonesia. From billion dollar petrochemical plants, toll highways, airline venture till the monopoly of citrus fruit in Kalimantan.

Another heavy financial burden for the Indonesian state are the high-technology dreams of Suharto's favourite minister Habibie. Habibie is stressing on the need to develop high-tech industry along the traditional export oriented manufacturing goods

like textile and shoes. His strategic industry, airplanes, ships and weapons, are part of the Indonesian military industrial complex are a very costly venture. State subsidies between $1.5 to $2 billion are gobbled up by Habibie and his high tech plans.

The jubilant stories about Indonesia's economic success has toned down considerably. Economic analysts are now using more restrained expressions like: "the economy is off track" or "has to find its proper course again" or "sound but too slow" or as the World Bank puts it: "if the momentum of development can be maintained...".

Some major things have remained the same in the **ORDE BARU**. The floating mass theory: people below district level are not allowed to be involved in formal politics. It means the overall majority of the Indonesian population are prohibited from involvement in politics. The *hankamrata* implementation remains consistent: a mild version in places like Java and a harsh version in places like East Timor, West Papua or Aceh. The security approach has always been the major thrust in the **ORDE BARU.**

At the same time, even in the **ORDE BARU**'s stalemate politics, things have changed. The global situation has changed drastically. The weapon of anti-communist has become blunted. Generals who still use anti-communist rhetoric have become laughing stock. Suharto's relationship with the military has changed considerably. Although on one hand they preserve the necessary security and stability, Suharto does not trust them any more.

Pancasila, the **ORDE BARU** ideology, has lost its zeal. In the early eighties the general **ORDE BARU** parole was *Azas Tunggal* , the sole principle or single loyalty. The heavy handed implementation of *Azas Tunggal*, the ultimate form of conformity and corporatist thinking has backfired. *Pancasila* as sole doctrine has become a spent issue.

In this quarter of the century, the **ORDE BARU** period, the Indonesian society also underwent changes. The formation of distinct social classes, the much greater mobility of people, the emergence of non-governmental organisations and the globalisation of many social issues.

Human rights, environmental and other social issues have become a major topic for many Indonesian activists. Workers and peasant issues have also become big issues in society. Indonesia cannot isolate itself any more and many activists have found their way to the international arena. People from different continents speak on the same wave length, deal with the same issues and exchange experience.

Keterbukaan, or Opening Up, the Indonesian buzz word for democratisation is gradually becoming a reality. There are also two sides: the objective and the subjective side. The objective side is a changing Indonesia whose economy is increasingly becoming part of the global economy. Although not automatically, a more liberal

economy also effects social and political life. Subjectively Suharto, for his own sake, has also created more space to manoeuvre which again is used by increasing numbers of people who desire democratic changes, to broaden the democratic space.

The long march towards democracy has started but the pace is still much too slow. A third and independent political force next to Suharto and ABRI is emerging but is not yet strong enough to form a serious threat to the two entities. One important asset of the third movement is pluriformity, which at the same time becomes a hindrance towards unity. The emergence of a strong, but at the same time, plural third force will take time.

At the same time, time is running out. Suharto has just celebrated his 72nd birthday and the natural aging process is moving ahead. Some succession scenarios are becoming more likely in the coming years.

In the slip in the bathroom scenario (or any other calamity) the military will step in and through constitutional means will run a kind of junta with General Try Sutrisno as nominal president. An influential person like General Benny Murdani will likely play an important role in this junta scenario. This kind of military regime will soon become an international misfit.

In the case Suharto remains healthy in his sixth presidential term, things could become much more complicated. A seventh term is highly unlikely, unless he wants to become listed in the Guiness Book of Records surpassing Hastings Banda of Malawi and Kim Il Sung of North Korea. In that case he will have a rough ride, as authoritarian rule isn't that automatic any more. This option, although remote, is still open and can become more feasible if Suharto's power base remains very small.

In the case he appoints a successor in 1997, a long and complicated procedure will be followed which can create all kinds of eruptions and social unrest. At present there are clear signs Suharto is opting for this scenario. He is seriously making efforts to broaden his power base. His alliance with wings of political Islam, notably with *ICMI* is one indication. His rapprochement with dissident groups like the Petition of 50 is another remarkable new development. In this option Suharto can only leave office if he has enough guarantee for his personal safety and his family. It will also mean that Suharto will pursue a much more populist, i.e. nationalist approach. The composition of his new cabinet are already heading in that direction.

In this scenario succession, Suharto also has to find a compromise with the ABRI top. The most likely compromise figure will be an army man who is close to Suharto. Although the majority of officers can be seen as anti Suharto, there will be enough loyalist officers left to choose from.

The world has seen different succession scenarios. The Turkish model where the

military are always at the starting blocks if something goes wrong with the civilian government. Or variants like the Pakistan version of military rule or the Pinochet version. In the most optimistic version: the South Korean model, the post Suharto regime will allow some democratic space.

Any major upheaval in the stifling political climate of the **ORDE BARU** can mean bad news. A new president will face huge difficulties, a possible decline in the economy. Examples of former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia should not be ignored. A process of desintegration can easily emerge. Racial and ethnic conflicts, at present all under the surface, can also emerge.

In any scenario the road to democracy will be long and winding. Principled issues like the right of self-determination for East Timor (and other regions) are still firmly on the agenda. Taboos like the mass killings in 1965 and the incarceration of 1.4 million people in the sixties and seventies have still to be reckoned with.

Liem Soei Liong, London, July 1993